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SMITH, Chief Judge.    
 Brandon Palakovic, a mentally ill young man who 
was imprisoned at the State Correctional Institution at 
Cresson, Pennsylvania (SCI Cresson), committed suicide 
after repeatedly being placed in solitary confinement.  
His parents, Renee and Darian Palakovic, brought this 
civil rights action after their son’s death.  The District 
Court dismissed the family’s Eighth Amendment claims 
against prison officials and medical personnel for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  We 
write today to clarify and elaborate upon the legal 
principles that apply to Eighth Amendment claims arising 
out of prison suicides.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will vacate the District Court’s dismissals. 
I. 
  The following allegations appear in the amended 
complaint.1  Brandon Palakovic2 was convicted of 
                                                 
1 The allegations of the original complaint are consistent 
with the allegations of the amended complaint but 
provide fewer details.  Where appropriate in our 
discussion of the specific claims raised in the original 
complaint, we have relied upon the allegations as set 
forth in the original, rather than the amended, complaint.  
  
2 For purposes of clarity, and intending no disrespect, we 
refer throughout this opinion to Brandon Palakovic by his 
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burglarizing an occupied structure in Perry County, 
Pennsylvania, and was sentenced by the state court to a 
term of 16–48 months’ imprisonment.  In April 2011, he 
arrived at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, 
Pennsylvania (SCI Camp Hill), for processing and 
classification.  Those procedures included a mental 
health screening.   
 Brandon informed SCI Camp Hill mental health 
staff that he had attempted suicide in the past and had 
engaged in self-harm as recently as August 2010.  He 
also advised staff that he experienced periodic thoughts 
of self-harm and suicide, and that he had made plans 
about how to kill himself.  Brandon was diagnosed with a 
number of serious mental disorders, including alcohol 
dependence, anti-social personality disorder, and impulse 
control disorder.  He was identified as a “suicide 
behavior risk,” J.A. 653, and was classified as “Stability 
Rating D,” signifying “a substantial disturbance of 
thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, 
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or cope with the 
ordinary demands of life,” J.A. 66.  It is the lowest 
stability rating given a prisoner in the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections (DOC) system.  He was, 
accordingly, placed on the prison mental health roster.   
                                                                                                             
first name and to his parents, the plaintiffs, as the 
Palakovics. 
 
3 “J.A.” refers to the parties’ Joint Appendix. 
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 Brandon was transferred to SCI Cresson in June 
2011.  During his incarceration at SCI Cresson, he 
reported feeling depressed, exhibited signs of depression, 
and acknowledged suicidal thoughts and a wish to die.  
His nickname within the prison became “Suicide.”  Yet 
no comprehensive suicide risk assessment was 
performed.  Brandon did not receive psychological 
counseling, drug and alcohol counseling, group therapy, 
or interviews in clinically appropriate settings; any 
mental health interviews were conducted “through the 
cell door slot in the solitary confinement unit.”  J.A. 82.   
 According to the amended complaint, mental 
healthcare at SCI Cresson was seriously deficient in 
many respects.  Specifically, the amended complaint 
alleged that  SCI Cresson had insufficient psychiatric 
staff, failed to ensure adequate frequency of mental 
health appointments, failed to provide proper oversight of 
medication regimes, kept poor medical records, and did 
not train staff on the proper response to prisoners with 
mental illness.  In addition, it was allegedly the practice 
at SCI Cresson that medications to treat mental illness 
were inadequately monitored for effectiveness and were 
used as a substitute for other, more effective treatments.   
 The amended complaint further alleged that SCI 
Cresson’s practice for dealing with mentally ill prisoners 
like Brandon was to relegate them to solitary 
confinement.  This meant that because of Brandon’s 
particular mental illnesses and lack of proper treatment, 
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his behavior was “going to continually land him in 
solitary confinement unless there was an intervention on 
his behalf.”  J.A. 85.  Therefore, over the course of his 
thirteen months at SCI Cresson, Brandon “was repeatedly 
subjected to solitary confinement via placement in the 
prison’s Restricted Housing Unit (RHU), characterized 
by extreme deprivations of social interaction and 
environmental stimulation, abusive staff, and inadequate 
to non-existent mental health care.”4  J.A. 68 (footnote 
omitted).   
 During his “multiple 30-day stints in solitary 
confinement,” J.A. 69, Brandon was exposed to extreme 
and trying conditions.  He was isolated for approximately 
23 to 24 hours each day, in a tiny cement cell of less than 
100 square feet with only small slit windows affording 
him minimal outside visibility.  He was not permitted to 
make phone calls, his possessions were limited to one 
small box, and his social interaction and environmental 
stimulation were severely reduced.  Brandon was 
permitted just one hour of exercise five days out of each 
week, which took place in an outdoor cage only slightly 
larger than his cell.   
                                                 
4 Neither the original complaint nor the amended 
complaint specifies the amount of time Brandon spent in 
solitary confinement during his 13-month incarceration at 
SCI Cresson, describing his stays there as “numerous,” 
“repeated,” and “multiple.”  See, e.g., J.A. 69. 
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 According to the amended complaint, prison 
officials were aware that exposure to these conditions 
carried mental health risks.  The majority of incidents of 
self-harm at SCI Cresson—including suicides and suicide 
attempts—took place in solitary confinement.  In 2011, 
14 of the 17 documented suicide attempts (more than 
80%) occurred in the prison’s solitary confinement units.  
There also were “dozens of incidents” in which prisoners 
on the mental health roster engaged in self-harm, “while 
just two such incidents occurred in the general 
population.”  J.A. 78–79.   
 Notably, during Brandon’s incarceration, the 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) announced 
that it would be undertaking an investigation into 
“allegations that SCI Cresson provided inadequate 
mental health care to prisoners who have mental illness, 
failed to adequately protect such prisoners from harm, 
and subjected them to excessively prolonged periods of 
isolation, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.”  J.A. 77.  As part of that 
investigation, the DOJ conducted a site visit from March 
19 to 22, 2012—also while Brandon was incarcerated—
during which it interviewed administrative staff, medical 
staff, and prisoners.  That investigation, as described in a 
report issued on May 31, 2013 (the “DOJ Report”), 
revealed “a wide array of policies and practices that were 
responsible for systemic deficiencies in SCI Cresson’s 
treatment of mentally ill and intellectually disabled 
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prisoners.”  J.A. 79; Department of Justice May 31, 2013 
Findings Letter, https:// www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/crt/legacy/2013/06/03/cresson_findings_5-
31-13.pdf (last visited April 4, 2017). 
 Among other things, the DOJ reported a “system-
wide failure of security staff to consider mental health 
issues appropriately,” a “fragmented and ineffective” 
mental healthcare program, insufficient mental healthcare 
staffing to meet the prison population’s needs, “[p]oor 
screening and diagnostic procedures,” poor 
recordkeeping “contributing to a dysfunctional system 
that undermined continuity of care,” “[d]eficient 
oversight mechanisms, including the failure to collect 
necessary information on critical incidents, such as acts 
of self-harm,” and a lack of training in the proper 
response to warning signs by prisoners with serious 
mental illness.  J.A. 79–80 (citing DOJ Report).  
Although Brandon was incarcerated at SCI Cresson while 
the DOJ conducted its investigation, he died before it 
issued its Report.   
 Brandon committed suicide on July 16, 2012, 
while in solitary confinement.  He was 23 years old.    
II. 
 As executors of their son’s estate, Brandon’s 
parents filed a five-count civil rights complaint on July 9, 
2014 in the United States District Court for the Western 
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District of Pennsylvania, naming a number of prison 
officials and mental healthcare providers.5  In that 
complaint, the Palakovics presented claims under the 
Eighth Amendment that all defendants had been 
deliberately indifferent to both inhumane conditions that 
Brandon experienced while in solitary confinement and 
to Brandon’s serious medical need for mental 
healthcare.6  The defendants filed motions under Rule 
                                                 
5 Specifically, the original complaint named John Wetzel 
(Secretary of the Pennsylvania DOC), Kenneth Cameron 
(SCI Cresson’s Superintendent), Jamie Boyles (SCI 
Cresson’s Deputy Superintendent for Facilities 
Management), Jamey Luther (SCI Cresson’s Deputy 
Superintendent for Centralized Services), Dr. James 
Harrington (SCI Cresson’s Chief Psychologist), Dr. 
Daleep Rathore (MHM employee and head of psychiatric 
care at SCI Cresson), Michelle Houser (Unit Manager in 
SCI Cresson’s Secure Special Needs Unit and Special 
Needs Unit), Morris Houser (Manager of SCI Cresson’s 
Mental Health Unit), Francis Pirozzola (SCI Cresson’s 
Security Captain), Shawn Kephart (Pennsylvania DOC’s 
Director of the Treatment Services Bureau), MHM (the 
company under contract with the Pennsylvania DOC to 
provide mental healthcare services at SCI Cresson), and 
six John Doe defendants. 
 
6 The constitutional claims initially were brought 
pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, but 
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12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.   
 On June 26, 2015, the District Court entered a 
memorandum opinion and order granting the motions to 
dismiss.  Rejecting the Palakovics’ arguments to the 
contrary, the District Court concluded that, because the 
case involved a prison suicide, the “vulnerability to 
suicide” legal framework applied and required the 
Palakovics to establish that: “(1) the detainee had a 
‘particular vulnerability to suicide,’ (2) the custodial 
officer or officers knew or should have known of that 
vulnerability, and (3) those officers ‘acted with reckless 
indifference’ to the detainee’s particular vulnerability.”7  
Palakovic v. Wetzel, No. 3:14-cv-145, 2015 WL 
3937499, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2015) (First 
                                                                                                             
later court filings clarified that the Palakovics were 
pursuing claims under the Eighth Amendment only.  The 
Palakovics also presented an Americans with Disabilities 
Act claim and two state law claims; the resolution of 
those claims is not at issue in this appeal. 
 
7 Although the District Court declared that “even if the 
vulnerability to suicide standard were inapplicable to 
either of Plaintiffs’ two Eighth Amendment claims, the 
result would be the same,” First Dismissal, 2015 WL 
3937499 at *4, it did not elaborate upon this statement. 
 
 12 
 
Dismissal) (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Township 
(Colburn II), 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991)).  
Because they did not plead facts sufficient to satisfy the 
vulnerability to suicide framework, the District Court 
dismissed the claims with leave to amend. 
 On August 7, 2015, the Palakovics filed their 
amended complaint.  They did not re-plead the claims set 
forth in the original complaint and instead presented four 
vulnerability to suicide claims against four groups of 
defendants.8  They also pled an Eighth Amendment 
“failure to train” claim against the supervisory officials.9   
                                                 
8 Count I against SCI Cresson mental health personnel 
(Drs. Harrington, Rathore, and Eidsvoog; Dr. Eidsvoog 
had not been named in the original complaint); Count II 
against corrections officers (Reed, Kushner, Dous, 
Boyles, and Luther; Reed, Kushner, and Dous had not 
been named in the original complaint); Count III against 
supervisory officials (Wetzel, Cameron, Boyles, and 
Luther); and Count V against MHM. 
 
9 The amended complaint also set forth claims for 
medical neglect, discrimination on the basis of disability, 
wrongful death, and a survival action.  The disposition of 
those claims is not relevant to this appeal.  The amended 
complaint did not name several of the officials that had 
been named in the original complaint—specifically, 
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 Two groups of defendants filed a second set of 
motions under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.10  On February 
22, 2016, the District Court granted the motions and 
dismissed the Eighth Amendment claims.  See Palakovic 
v. Wetzel, No. 3:14-cv-145, 2016 WL 707486 (W.D. Pa. 
Feb. 22, 2016) (Second Dismissal).  The District Court 
again granted leave to amend, but the Palakovics 
declined to file a second amended complaint.  Instead, on 
April 15, 2016, they filed a motion to voluntarily 
withdraw the claims against the three remaining 
defendants (Kushner, Reed, and Dous) pursuant to Rule 
41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
express purpose of filing this appeal.  The District Court 
granted the motion, noting that the Palakovics had 
indicated an intention to stand on the amended complaint.  
The District Court entered judgment in favor of the 
defendants, and the Palakovics timely appealed. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
Michelle Houser, Morris Houser, Francis Pirozolla, 
Shawn Kephart, and the six John Does.   
 
10 Defendants Dous, Reed, and Kushner were not served 
and did not file a motion to dismiss. 
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III. 
A. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.  We have jurisdiction to 
review a final order of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Although we generally do not exercise 
jurisdiction where a District Court dismisses a complaint 
without prejudice and grants leave to amend, see Borelli 
v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976), 
such an order is final and reviewable under § 1291 
where, as here, a party declares an intention to stand on 
the complaint, id. at 952.11 
                                                 
11 Rule 41(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that a voluntary dismissal is without 
prejudice, unless the order states otherwise.  Where a 
dismissal is without prejudice, the judgment may not be 
final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See 
Borelli, 532 F.2d at 951.  Here, the voluntary dismissal 
order was silent as to whether the claims against 
Kushner, Reed, and Dous were dismissed with prejudice.  
At oral argument, however, counsel for the Palakovics 
clarified that the dismissal was with prejudice and that 
the Palakovics have abandoned all claims against 
Kushner, Reed, and Dous.  This is sufficient to render the 
voluntary dismissal final for purposes of appeal. 
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B. 
 We conduct a plenary review of an order granting 
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle 
Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011).  The Rules 
of Civil Procedure demand that a plaintiff present “only 
‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.’”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (alteration in original).  
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Id.; see also Sheridan v. NGK 
Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n. 27 (3d Cir. 2010).  To 
assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and 
Iqbal, a court must:  “First, . . . ‘tak[e] note of the 
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’  Second, 
. . . identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more 
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of 
truth.’  Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual 
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allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement for relief.’”  Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 
662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 
629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)).   
C. 
 The Palakovics seek to appeal the District Court’s 
First Dismissal, although they did not re-plead their 
original conditions of confinement and serious medical 
need claims in the amended complaint.  Nor did they 
express an intention to preserve those claims for appeal.  
As an initial matter, then, we must consider whether 
appellate review of the First Dismissal has been waived. 
 In general, an interlocutory order—like the First 
Dismissal order here—merges with the final judgment 
and is reviewable on appeal from the final judgment 
entered in the case.  See In re: Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 
90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d Cir. 1996).  Also in general, an 
amended pleading—like the amended complaint here—
supersedes the earlier pleading and renders the original 
pleading a nullity.  See W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., 
LLC v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d 
Cir. 2013); 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2010).  
Obviously, there is considerable tension between these 
two principles as we consider the matter before us—a 
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tension that can be resolved only by deciding which 
principle prevails.  Under the circumstances presented, 
we conclude that, while it would have been preferable for 
the Palakovics to have taken express, affirmative 
measures to ensure the preservation of their original 
claims for appellate review,12 they have not waived those 
claims.  We may therefore review the District Court’s 
First Dismissal. 
 In United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pennsylvania 
Shipbuilding Co., we observed that “the proper rule 
allows plaintiffs to appeal dismissals despite amended 
pleadings that omit the dismissed claim provided 
repleading the particular cause of action would have been 
futile.”  473 F.3d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 2007).  We went on 
to explain that “[r]epleading is futile when the dismissal 
was ‘on the merits.’  A dismissal is on the merits when it 
is with prejudice or based on some legal barrier other 
than want of specificity or particularity.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Thus, when a pleading “error” goes to the legal 
requirements of a cause of action, the dismissal is likely 
on the merits and should be reviewable on appeal.  Id. at 
517 n.17. 
                                                 
12 The Palakovics could have more clearly preserved their 
original claims by “specifically refer[ring] to or 
adopt[ing]” them in the amended complaint.  W. Run. 
Student Hous. Assocs., 712 F.3d at 171. 
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 Here, the District Court’s First Dismissal states 
that the Eighth Amendment claims in the original 
complaint were dismissed for factual insufficiency.  Yet 
that conclusion rested upon the District Court’s 
application of the vulnerability to suicide framework.  
The Palakovics contend that application of that 
framework was legal error.   
 We conclude that the claims in the original 
complaint were dismissed on legal grounds, rather than 
due to a lack of factual specificity.  See id. at 517.  It is 
apparent that the District Court would not have been 
satisfied by a more detailed factual account to support the 
Palakovics’ claims.  Additional facts simply would not 
have addressed the legal flaw that provided the basis for 
dismissal—i.e., the failure to plead allegations supporting 
a vulnerability to suicide claim.  Because repleading 
would have been futile, the legal argument that the 
vulnerability to suicide framework never should have 
been applied is properly raised on appeal.  Moreover, if 
there were any doubt, Atkinson directs that such doubt 
must be resolved in favor of the Palakovics and, thus, in 
favor of appellate review.  Id.  Accordingly, the Eighth 
Amendment claims as set forth in the original complaint 
have not been waived and we will consider whether the 
District Court properly dismissed them.13 
                                                 
13 In contrast with theories dismissed by a legal ruling, 
parties voluntarily dropped from an amended complaint 
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IV. 
 Before turning to our review of the District Court’s 
First Dismissal, it is necessary that we take a close look 
at the vulnerability to suicide framework that guided the 
District Court’s decisionmaking process.  Our 
vulnerability to suicide jurisprudence is set forth in three 
primary cases:  Colburn v. Upper Darby Township 
(Colburn I), 838 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1988); Colburn v. 
Upper Darby Township (Colburn II), 946 F.2d 1017 (3d 
Cir. 1991); and Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 
F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2005).  These cases addressed claims 
that prison officials violated the Constitution by failing to 
protect pre-trial detainees from harming themselves.  We 
discuss each in turn. 
                                                                                                             
do not remain in the case.  See Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 518 
(“It would be unjust under these circumstances to enable 
[plaintiff] to drag [a defendant] back into this case after 
[that defendant], by [plaintiff’s] own decision, was 
dropped as a defendant.”).  Accordingly, the claims 
asserted against the four defendants named in the original 
complaint who were dropped from the amended 
complaint (Michelle Houser, Morris Houser, Francis 
Pirozzola, and Shawn Kephart) are waived and may not 
be challenged on appeal.  We will not consider any 
claims in the original complaint as they applied to those 
four defendants.  
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 In Colburn I, Melinda Lee Stierheim was arrested 
for public intoxication.  Colburn I, 838 F.2d at 664.  Four 
hours after her arrest, while in police custody, she died 
from a self-inflicted gunshot wound.  Id. at 665.  Sue 
Ann Colburn, Melinda’s mother and administratrix of her 
estate, filed a § 1983 complaint against prison officials 
alleging, inter alia, that they violated Melinda’s 
constitutional rights because they knew or should have 
known that Melinda was a suicide risk and therefore had 
an obligation to protect her against that risk.  Id.  The 
District Court granted the officials’ motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.  Id.  
 We reversed.14  We first examined cases holding 
that inmates who had been victims of violence by other 
inmates could bring claims under the Eighth Amendment 
against their custodians where those custodians 
deliberately or recklessly disregarded the risk to those 
inmates’ safety.  Id. at 667–68.  We reasoned that such 
                                                 
14 Because Colburn I was decided long before Iqbal and 
Twombly, we applied the standard of review then in 
effect:  taking all well-pleaded allegations as true, we 
construed the complaint in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and determined whether there was a reasonable 
reading of the pleadings under which she may be entitled 
to relief.  Colburn I, 838 F.2d at 665–66 (citing Estate of 
Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 506 (3d 
Cir. 1985)). 
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cases can be analogized to the scenario in which the acts 
causing the injury to the prisoner are those of the prisoner 
herself.  Id. at 668.  We further concluded that the 
fundamental protections afforded to prisoners under the 
Eighth Amendment, like personal security, are also 
afforded to pre-trial detainees.  Id.  Although the Eighth 
Amendment does not apply directly to pre-trial detainees, 
see Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2000), 
we concluded that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides pre-trial detainees at 
least as much protection for personal security as the level 
guaranteed to prisoners by the Eighth Amendment.  
Colburn I, 838 F.2d at 668.   
 We recognized that it would be inappropriate to 
place custodial officials in a position in which they must 
guarantee that an inmate will not commit suicide.  Id. at 
669.  We decided, however, that this consideration 
should not preclude the possibility of a § 1983 cause of 
action:  
Of course we agree that custodial officials 
cannot be placed in the position of 
guaranteeing that inmates will not commit 
suicide.  On the other hand, if such officials 
know or should know of the particular 
vulnerability to suicide of an inmate, then 
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on 
them an obligation not to act with reckless 
indifference to that vulnerability.   
 22 
 
Id. at 669.  Because Colburn adequately alleged that the 
defendants in her case acted with such reckless 
indifference, we held that Colburn could—and did—state 
a § 1983 claim against prison officials for their failure to 
prevent Melinda’s suicide.  Id. at 670–71.  
 After remand and a period of discovery, the 
District Court granted summary judgment in the prison 
officials’ favor.  The matter then returned to this Court 
via a second appeal.  Colburn II, 946 F.2d 1017.   
 In Colburn II, we recognized that “Colburn I 
established the standard of liability to be applied in this 
circuit in prison suicide cases.”  Id. at 1023.  We 
explained that the vulnerability to suicide framework is 
simply a more specific application of the general rule set 
forth in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), 
which requires that prison officials not be deliberately 
indifferent to the serious medical needs of prisoners.  In 
essence, a “particular vulnerability to suicide” is just one 
type of “serious medical need.”  Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 
1023.   
 We then examined more closely what it means to 
have a “particular vulnerability to suicide.”  We observed 
that an individual’s particular vulnerability to suicide 
“speaks to the degree of risk inherent in the detainee’s 
condition.”  Id. at 1024.  That degree of risk must be a 
“strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that 
self-inflicted harm will occur.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
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We explained that a detainee’s “strong likelihood” of 
suicide “must be ‘so obvious that a lay person would 
easily recognize the necessity for’ preventative action.”  
Id. at 1025 (citing Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. 
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)).   
 In addition to the particular vulnerability of the 
detainee, we also required a relatively high level of 
culpability on the part of prison officials before holding 
them accountable, i.e., reckless or deliberate indifference 
to that “strong likelihood” of suicide.  We declined to 
precisely define these terms, instead observing that 
liability may attach only where the officials’ culpability 
is something beyond mere negligence.  Colburn II, 946 
F.2d at 1024–25.  We noted other situations in which 
custodians had been found to “know” of a particular 
vulnerability to suicide—including, for example, where 
“they have had actual knowledge of an obviously serious 
suicide threat, a history of suicide attempts, or a 
psychiatric diagnosis identifying suicidal propensities.”  
Id. at 1025 n.1. 
 Applying these principles in Colburn II, we 
determined that Colburn failed to establish a violation of 
Melinda’s Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process 
based upon prison officials’ deliberate indifference to her 
particular vulnerability to suicide.  Viewing the 
developed record in the light most favorable to Colburn, 
a rational trier of fact could have concluded only that, 
upon her arrest, prison officials knew or should have 
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known that Melinda was intoxicated, had had an 
argument with her boyfriend, had tried to ingest three 
pills, had a bullet in her pocket, and had faint scars on her 
forearm.  Id. at 1026–27.  Given these facts, we upheld 
the District Court’s determination that, as a matter of law, 
Melinda’s particular vulnerability was not sufficiently 
obvious to hold the prison officials accountable for 
failing to prevent her suicide.  Id. at 1027.   
 Finally, we revisited this framework in Woloszyn 
v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2005).  In 
that case, Richard Lee Woloszyn was arrested for 
attempted burglary and was taken into police custody.  
Id. at 316.  Several hours later, he was found hanging by 
his neck in his cell.  Id. at 318.  His estate filed a § 1983 
action seeking to hold prison officials accountable for 
failing to prevent the suicide.  Id. at 318–19.  After 
discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the prison officials.  Id. at 319.   
 On appeal, we first considered the culpability 
element set forth in Colburn I and Colburn II—i.e., that 
officials “knew or should have known” of a strong 
likelihood of suicide.  As we did in the Colburn cases, we 
once again recognized that while Eighth Amendment 
standards do not directly control in pretrial detainee 
cases, the “deliberate indifference” standard that applies 
to officials under the Eighth Amendment probably is the 
“equivalent” to the “should have known” element in a 
vulnerability to suicide case involving a detainee.  
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Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 321.  To the extent the issue 
remained open, we opted not to conclusively resolve it 
because we determined that the developed record was 
devoid of evidence of Woloszyn’s “particular 
vulnerability to suicide.”  Id. at 321–22.  
 Among other things, the record demonstrated that 
Woloszyn had been in good spirits and had specifically 
denied being suicidal.  Id. at 322.  While there was one 
witness who testified that Woloszyn had been remorseful 
and distant and had discussed both a recent drug and 
alcohol binge and his feelings of failure as a father, the 
court concluded that “such statements, without more, are 
[not] sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding knowledge of Woloszyn’s vulnerability to 
suicide.  They do not show that there was ‘a strong 
likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that self-
inflicted harm will occur.’”  Id. at 322–23.  We therefore 
affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants. 
* * * 
 In sum, our case law teaches that, when a plaintiff 
seeks to hold a prison official liable for failing to prevent 
a detainee’s suicide, a pre-trial detainee may bring a 
claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that is essentially equivalent to the claim 
that a prisoner may bring under the Eighth Amendment.  
Thus, whether a pre-trial detainee or a convicted 
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prisoner, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the individual 
had a particular vulnerability to suicide, meaning that 
there was a “strong likelihood, rather than a mere 
possibility,” that a suicide would be attempted; (2) that 
the prison official knew or should have known of the 
individual’s particular vulnerability; and (3) that the 
official acted with reckless or deliberate indifference, 
meaning something beyond mere negligence, to the 
individual’s particular vulnerability.15  We must now 
consider the application of these principles, where 
appropriate, to Brandon Palakovic’s circumstances. 
V. 
A. 
 Returning to the first constitutional claim 
presented in the original complaint, “Plaintiffs contend 
that Defendants were deliberately indifferent by placing 
[Brandon] in solitary confinement, given his mental 
health vulnerabilities, which deprived him of basic 
human needs of environmental stimulation, social 
                                                 
15 In Colburn II, we did not precisely define the terms 
“deliberate indifference” or “reckless indifference,” 
concluding that, whichever formulation is employed, it 
indicates a level of culpability beyond mere negligence.  
946 F.2d at 1024.  We once again do not find it necessary 
to parse these phrases to determine whether there is some 
distinction between them.    
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interaction, mental health, and physical health.”  First 
Dismissal, 2015 WL 3937499 at *4.  Considering this 
claim, the District Court determined “that this case 
involves a prison suicide and that the ‘vulnerability to 
suicide’ standard used by courts in this Circuit applies to 
Plaintiffs’ allegations.”  Id.  It concluded that the original 
complaint failed to state a claim because it did not allege 
facts sufficient to satisfy any of the three prongs of a 
vulnerability to suicide claim.16  Id. at *5–6.   
                                                 
16 The District Court reasoned: “First, Plaintiffs have not 
alleged facts showing that [Brandon] had a particular 
vulnerability to suicide” because the complaint was 
“devoid of any factual allegations that there was a strong 
likelihood that self-inflicted harm would occur.”  First 
Dismissal, 2015 WL 3937499 at *5.  Next, the District 
Court concluded that “Plaintiffs have not alleged facts 
showing that Defendants knew or should have known 
about [Brandon’s] particular vulnerability to suicide.”  Id.  
The District Court observed, for example, that “nowhere 
do Plaintiffs allege that any of the Defendants had any 
knowledge of [Brandon’s] history of suicide attempts or 
suicidal thoughts. There are no allegations in the 
complaint that [Brandon] attempted suicide while at the 
prison or made his suicidal thoughts or tendencies known 
to Defendants.”  Id. at *6.  Finally, the District Court 
concluded that the complaint failed to allege facts 
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 The Palakovics have consistently argued that this 
claim should not have been considered through the lens 
of the vulnerability to suicide framework.  They sought 
to hold prison officials accountable for injuries that 
Brandon experienced during his periods of isolation in 
solitary confinement while he was alive, not to hold 
officials accountable (at least, not directly accountable) 
for failing to prevent his death.  Their claim was 
independent of a particular vulnerability to suicide on 
Brandon’s part.   
 To at least some degree, the District Court was 
persuaded to apply the vulnerability to suicide framework 
to the Palakovics’ claims because of our language in 
Colburn II that “Colburn I established the standard of 
liability to be applied in this circuit in prison suicide 
cases.”  Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1023.  We clarify today 
that this statement indicates that the vulnerability to 
suicide framework applies when a plaintiff seeks to hold 
prison officials accountable for failing to prevent a prison 
suicide.  It does not, however, preclude other types of 
claims, even if those claims also relate to an individual 
who committed suicide while in prison.   
 Here, to the extent Brandon could have brought an 
Eighth Amendment claim contesting his conditions of 
                                                                                                             
showing that the defendants were deliberately indifferent 
to any vulnerability.  See id. 
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confinement while he was alive, his family should not be 
precluded from doing so because he has passed away.  
We agree with the Palakovics that their original claim 
need not have to fit within the vulnerability to suicide 
framework, and the District Court erred in dismissing it 
solely for that reason.   
B. 
 A claim of inhumane prison conditions may rise to 
the level of an Eighth Amendment violation where the 
prison official “deprived the prisoner of the minimal 
civilized measure of life’s necessities” and “acted with 
deliberate indifference in doing so, thereby exposing the 
inmate to a substantial risk of serious damage to [his] 
future health.”  Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 335 
(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Corr., 806 F. 3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015)).   
 The original complaint alleged that several 
defendants were either responsible for Brandon’s 
repeated placement in solitary confinement or indirectly 
responsible through policies and practices that led to his 
repeated confinement there.17  For instance, the 
                                                 
17 A supervisor may be directly liable under the deliberate 
indifference test set forth in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825 (1994), if the supervisor “knew or w[as] aware of 
and disregarded an excessive risk to the plaintiff[’s] 
health or safety[.]”  Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 
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Palakovics alleged that supervisory officials Wetzel, 
Cameron, Boyles, Luther, and Harrington “all upheld 
policies and practices [at SCI Cresson] of sentencing 
prisoners to solitary confinement based on behavior that 
was caused by mental illness and intellectual disability.”  
J.A. 18.  In addition, Wetzel, Cameron, Boyles and 
Luther had responsibility for, among other things, 
disciplinary proceedings and punishment and policies 
pertaining to the use of solitary confinement.  Finally, 
Boyles and Luther were members of the “Program 
Review Committee,” which was directly responsible “for 
oversight of the RHU, including review of the 
appropriateness of placement in the RHU for individual 
prisoners.”  J.A. 25–26. 
 The next question, then, is whether those 
defendants with responsibility for Brandon’s placement 
in solitary confinement were alleged to have sufficient 
                                                                                                             
120, 135 (3d Cir. 2001).  A plaintiff “can show this by 
establishing that the risk was obvious.”  Id.  There is 
some question as to whether a supervisor may be held 
indirectly liable for deficient policies under Sample v. 
Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989)), as the 
Supreme Court may have called the so-called Sample test 
into question in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
Because the Palakovics have plausibly alleged a claim 
based on direct supervisory liability, we need not 
consider the unresolved nature of the Sample test today. 
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knowledge that the conditions there were inhumane for 
him in light of his mental illness.  Before we turn to the 
Palakovics’ particular allegations, we first acknowledge 
the robust body of legal and scientific authority 
recognizing the devastating mental health consequences 
caused by long-term isolation in solitary confinement.  In 
our recent decision, Williams v. Secretary of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 848 F.3d 549 
(3d Cir. 2017), we observed a growing consensus—with 
roots going back a century—that conditions like those to 
which Brandon repeatedly was subjected can cause 
severe and traumatic psychological damage, including 
anxiety, panic, paranoia, depression, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, psychosis, and even a disintegration of the basic 
sense of self identity.18  Id. at 566–67.  And the damage 
                                                 
18 While Williams addressed Due Process claims brought 
by death row inmates, the conditions on death row there 
mirror in many respects those of the RHU as described in 
the Palakovics’ amended complaint, including enclosure 
in a small windowless cement cell for the majority of 
each day, severely limited social contact, and little 
exercise or exposure to fresh air.  See Williams, 848 F.3d 
at 554–55, 563.  In Williams, we determined that 
indefinite confinement in such conditions, when the 
initial justification for the confinement ceased to exist, 
caused an atypical and significant hardship relative to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life, thereby giving rise to a 
protected liberty interest.  Id. at 561–64. 
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does not stop at mental harm:  “Physical harm can also 
result.  Studies have documented high rates of suicide 
and self-mutilation amongst inmates who have been 
subjected to solitary confinement.  These behaviors are 
believed to be maladaptive mechanisms for dealing with 
the psychological suffering that comes from isolation.”  
Id. at 567–68 (citations omitted).  Against this backdrop 
of the extremely serious and potentially dire 
consequences of lengthy exposure to the conditions of 
solitary confinement, we turn to the sufficiency of the 
Palakovics’ claim that prison officials who were aware of 
his history of mental illness permitted Brandon to be 
repeatedly exposed to inhumane conditions of 
confinement and acted with deliberate indifference in 
doing so.   
 The original complaint adequately alleged that the 
prison diagnosed Brandon with an array of serious 
mental health issues and placed him on a mental health 
roster, making it quite reasonable to infer that prison 
officials had (or should have had) knowledge of those 
diagnoses.  The complaint further  alleged that Wetzel 
and his subordinates were aware that the conditions of 
solitary confinement “cause severe psychological harm, 
exacerbate pre-existing mental health problems, and 
generated the majority of suicides, suicide attempts, and 
acts of self-harm at SCI Cresson and throughout the 
entire [Pennsylvania DOC].”  J.A. 15.  While perhaps a 
somewhat conclusory allegation on its own, this was 
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buttressed by allegations of the officials’ specific 
awareness of suicides and instances of self-harm that had 
occurred just before Brandon’s confinement, and was 
underscored by the Department of Justice’s announced 
investigation, which it conducted for the express purpose 
of determining whether SCI Cresson routinely subjected 
mentally ill prisoners (like Brandon) to unnecessarily 
harmful conditions of confinement.   
 Considering these factual allegations in light of the 
increasingly obvious reality that extended stays in 
solitary confinement can cause serious damage to mental 
health, we view these allegations as more than sufficient 
to state a plausible claim that Brandon experienced 
inhumane conditions of confinement to which the prison 
officials—Wetzel, Cameron, Boyles, Luther, and 
Harrington—were deliberately indifferent.19  We 
therefore conclude that the District Court should have 
allowed this claim to proceed to discovery.20 
                                                 
19 In contrast, we have not identified any allegations that 
could plausibly establish that Dr. Rathore or MHM had 
any role in Brandon’s placement in solitary confinement.  
Accordingly, the claim was properly dismissed as to 
these defendants. 
 
20 To the extent the Palakovics attempted to bring any 
Eighth Amendment claims against the prison officials in 
their official capacities, such claims were properly 
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C. 
                                                                                                             
dismissed.  Official capacity claims are treated as brought 
against the State, which is not a “person” under § 1983.  
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991).  Claims under 
§ 1983 may proceed only against the defendants in their 
individual capacities.  See id. at 31. 
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 We next consider the Palakovics’ claim that all 
defendants violated Brandon’s constitutional rights by 
providing inadequate mental healthcare treatment.21  In 
assessing the Palakovics’ serious medical needs claim, 
the District Court first observed that “as explained above, 
the complaint has not alleged that [Brandon] had a 
particular vulnerability to suicide.”  First Dismissal, 2015 
WL 3937499 at *8.  The District Court went on to 
conclude that “the complaint does not allege facts 
showing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to 
[Brandon’s] serious medical needs related to his mental 
health treatment at the prison,” id., because he received 
some mental health care while at SCI Cresson:  
“[Brandon] was placed on the prison’s mental health 
roster, he was prescribed medication, and he was visited 
by mental health staff,” id.  at *9.22  We disagree with 
both conclusions.  Neither the failure to plead a particular 
vulnerability to suicide nor the acknowledgment that 
                                                 
21 Specifically, the named defendants were prison 
officials Wetzel, Cameron, Boyles, Luther, and 
Harrington and medical providers Rathore and MHM. 
 
22 While Brandon’s placement on the mental health roster 
appears to signify that he required mental health 
treatment, we see no basis for a conclusion that 
placement on the prison mental health roster alone is a 
form of treatment. 
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Brandon received some mental healthcare during his 
incarceration precludes this claim. 
 The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials 
from being deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious 
medical needs.23  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 
(1976).  “To act with deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk 
of serious harm.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 
(3d Cir. 2009).  While we have recognized that a 
particular vulnerability to suicide qualifies as a serious 
medical need, see Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1023, a 
vulnerability to suicide is not the sole need on which the 
Palakovics’ claim was focused.  Rather, the Palakovics 
sought to hold prison officials and mental healthcare staff 
accountable for failing to meet Brandon’s serious need 
for mental healthcare. 
 As masters of their complaint, the Palakovics 
wished to bring this claim without regard to Brandon’s 
particular vulnerability (or lack thereof) to suicide, and 
                                                 
23 A medical need is serious where it “has been diagnosed 
by a physician as requiring treatment” or is “so obvious 
that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity” of 
medical attention.  Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates, 
834 F.2d at 347.  It is undisputed that the allegations of 
the complaint demonstrated that Brandon Palakovic had a 
serious need for mental healthcare treatment. 
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instead wished to pursue a more general claim under 
Estelle that the SCI Cresson officials were deliberately 
indifferent to Brandon’s serious need for adequate mental 
healthcare and that this indifference led to injury in the 
form of deterioration of Brandon’s condition ultimately 
leading to his suicide.  In other words, they were, once 
again, not attempting to directly claim that the prison 
officials should be held liable for failing to prevent 
Brandon’s suicide. 
 Where a prisoner has received some amount of 
medical treatment, it is difficult to establish deliberate 
indifference, because prison officials are afforded 
considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of 
prisoners.  See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  Allegations of mere negligent treatment or 
even medical malpractice do not trigger the protections 
of the Eighth Amendment.  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06.  
“Where a prisoner has received some medical attention 
and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, 
federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess 
medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which 
sound in state tort law.”  United States ex rel. Walker v. 
Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted).  Deference is 
given to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and 
treatment of patients, and courts “disavow any attempt to 
second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular 
course of treatment . . . [which] remains a question of 
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sound professional judgment.”  Inmates of Allegheny Cty. 
Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting 
Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)) 
(alterations in original). 
 Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which 
some care is provided yet it is insufficient to satisfy 
constitutional requirements.  For instance, prison officials 
may not, with deliberate indifference to the serious 
medical needs of the inmate, opt for “an easier and less 
efficacious treatment” of the inmate’s condition.  West v. 
Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting 
Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974)).  
Nor may “prison authorities deny reasonable requests for 
medical treatment . . . [when] such denial exposes the 
inmate ‘to undue suffering or the threat of tangible 
residual injury.’”  Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates, 
834 F.2d at 346 (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 
857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976)).  And, “knowledge of the need 
for medical care [may not be accompanied by the] . . . 
intentional refusal to provide that care.”  Id. (alterations 
in original) (quoting Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 
F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 Brandon Palakovic suffered from serious mental 
healthcare issues:  He had informed prison mental health 
staff of prior suicide attempts and self-injury; he had 
been diagnosed with a number of serious mental 
disorders; and the prison labeled him “Stability Rating 
D” and placed him on the prison mental health roster.  
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And SCI Cresson personnel did treat Brandon’s mental 
illness while he was an inmate.  Specifically, according 
to the original complaint, Brandon was prescribed 
antidepressant medication and was visited by psychology 
staff on three occasions.   
 The Palakovics claim that, despite this minimal 
treatment, the defendants intentionally or recklessly 
provided Brandon with mental healthcare that was so 
grossly deficient that it violated the Constitution.  They 
alleged, for instance, that Brandon requested counseling 
from a psychiatrist, but his request was ignored and a 
psychiatrist did not provide treatment.  They further 
alleged that medical staff refused to provide Brandon 
with necessary forms of treatment and instead relied only 
on medication—but then neglected to ever evaluate the 
efficacy of the medication, even after Brandon himself 
advised staff that the medications were not effective.   
 More broadly, according to the Palakovics, Dr. 
Harrington—chief psychologist at SCI Cresson and the 
individual with responsibility for mental health services 
throughout the prison—expressly prohibited medical 
personnel from speaking with mentally ill prisoners in 
solitary confinement “for more than 1–2 minutes at a 
time through solid steel doors.”  J.A. 27.  They further 
alleged that SCI Cresson had “systemic deficiencies” in 
mental healthcare treatment, and failed “to adhere to the 
minimal components of a constitutional prison mental 
health care system”—conclusions that the DOJ reached 
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in its investigation.  J.A. 20–21.  These systemic 
deficiencies included punishing the mentally ill rather 
than treating them, a fragmented mental healthcare 
program with insufficient staffing and poor diagnostic 
procedures, and a failure to have any program to identify, 
treat, or supervise prisoners at risk for suicide.  
According to the Palakovics, “SCI Cresson’s lack of a 
systematic program for screening and evaluating 
prisoners in need of mental health care caused officials to 
understate, delay, and ignore Brandon Palakovic’s need 
for mental health care during his confinement.”  J.A. 22. 
 And there is a final, key component to the 
Palakovics’ claim, which takes it from the realm of mere 
negligence to a potential claim of constitutional 
magnitude: the defendants permitted Brandon—with his 
fragile mental health condition and history of self-harm 
and suicide attempts—to be repeatedly subjected to the 
harsh and unforgiving confines of solitary confinement.  
Allegedly ignoring the prison’s express written policy, 
which acknowledges that placement of mentally ill 
prisoners in solitary confinement can increase the 
potential for suicide due to the “inherent stress” of those 
conditions, the defendants nonetheless “substituted 
solitary confinement for treatment.”24 J.A. 22.  Thus, the 
                                                 
24 The supervisory defendants (Wetzel, Cameron, Luther 
Boyles, and Harrington) are not alleged to have been 
personally responsible for Brandon’s mental healthcare 
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defendants are alleged to have affirmatively contributed 
to causing Brandon’s serious mental health conditions to 
deteriorate.  J.A. 16 (“Although Brandon had a ‘history 
of self-harm and suicide attempts, he continued to be 
placed in isolation, eventually leading to his death.’” 
(quoting DOJ Report)). 
 Considering these allegations and recognizing the 
high bar the Palakovics must meet in order to ultimately 
prevail, we conclude that they have presented allegations 
                                                                                                             
treatment.  Nevertheless, the Palakovics adequately 
alleged that the supervisory defendants were directly 
responsible for the allegedly unreasonable and dangerous 
practice at SCI Cresson of substituting solitary 
confinement for mental healthcare treatment, and that 
those supervisors knew such placement in solitary 
confinement could increase the risk of suicide.  The 
Palakovics further alleged that, despite that knowledge 
and the obviousness of the risk, the supervisory 
defendants did nothing.  Therefore, the Palakovics 
presented a plausible claim of direct supervisory liability 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  See Beers-
Capitol, 256 F.3d at 135 (“to make out a claim of 
deliberate indifference based on direct liability” plaintiffs 
must allege “that the defendants knew or were aware of 
and disregarded an excessive risk to the plaintiffs’ health 
or safety”). 
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sufficient to state a plausible claim warranting discovery:  
Despite receiving some minimal care, Brandon received 
mental health treatment while at SCI Cresson that fell 
below constitutionally adequate standards, and the 
defendants—both the mental healthcare personnel 
providing treatment and the supervisory officials and 
medical corporation responsible for the prison’s mental 
healthcare treatment policies—were deliberately 
indifferent to Brandon’s serious medical needs.  Thus, 
this claim, too, should have survived dismissal. 
VI. 
 After the District Court’s First Dismissal made 
clear that their claims would not proceed beyond the 
pleading stage if those claims did not include allegations 
meeting the vulnerability to suicide framework, the 
Palakovics amended their complaint to set forth four 
vulnerability to suicide claims and a failure to train 
claim.  The District Court dismissed those claims as well.   
A. 
1. 
 The amended complaint alleged that Brandon 
disclosed to prison personnel his history of suicide 
attempts, including an attempt in the recent past, his 
periodic thoughts of both self-harm and suicide, and even 
that he had made specific plans about how he would go 
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about killing himself.  He had been diagnosed with an 
array of serious mental illnesses, exhibited signs of 
depression, shared his suicidal thoughts with prison staff, 
and expressed a wish to die.  Unsurprisingly, after the 
prison considered these indications, it labeled him a 
“suicide behavior risk.”  J.A. 65.  Despite these 
allegations, the District Court concluded that the 
amended complaint was insufficient to “establish a strong 
likelihood that Palakovic would inflict self-harm.”  
Second Dismissal, 2016 WL 707486 at *6.  We cannot 
agree.   
 When a mentally ill, depressed person has 
attempted to kill himself multiple times, has engaged in 
self-harm, declares he has been thinking about killing and 
harming himself, and has made an actual plan of how he 
would carry out his own suicide, it cannot be said as a 
matter of law that the risk of suicide is nothing more than 
a “mere possibility.”  Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 322 (quoting 
Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1024).  Brandon’s suicidal 
propensities were so readily apparent that his fellow 
inmates nicknamed him “Suicide.”  J.A. 69; see Colburn 
II, 946 F.2d at 1025 (there is a “strong likelihood” where 
a lay person would recognize the necessity for preventive 
action).  If we were to conclude that Brandon’s 
circumstances were insufficient to allege a “particular 
vulnerability to suicide,” it is difficult to imagine how 
any plaintiff could ever succeed in doing so.   
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 Our statements in Woloszyn and Colburn II 
requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a “strong likelihood” 
of self-harm were never intended to demand a heightened 
showing at the pleading stage by demonstrating—as the 
District Court seemed to require here—that the plaintiff’s 
suicide was temporally imminent or somehow clinically 
inevitable.  A particular individual’s vulnerability to 
suicide  must be assessed based on the totality of the facts 
presented.  In our view, the sum of the facts alleged in 
the amended complaint are more than sufficient to 
support plausible inferences that there was a “strong 
likelihood” that self-inflicted harm would occur, and that 
Brandon therefore suffered from a particular 
vulnerability to suicide.  
2. 
 The District Court also determined that the 
amended complaint did not allege facts “showing that 
Defendants knew or should have known about 
[Brandon’s] particular vulnerability to suicide” because 
the Palakovics “only generally allege that Defendants 
‘were aware of’ or ‘were familiar with’ [Brandon’s] 
medical history, vulnerability to suicide, and his 
nickname of ‘Suicide.’”  Second Dismissal, 2016 WL 
707486 at *6.  We do not read the amended complaint so 
narrowly.   
 The Palakovics plausibly alleged that defendants 
Harrington, Rathore, Eidsvoog, Boyles, and Luther all 
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knew of Brandon’s particular vulnerability to suicide, or 
if they did not actually know, at least should have known.  
We have observed that prison officials “know” of a 
particular vulnerability to suicide where they have had 
actual knowledge of a history of suicide attempts or a 
diagnosis identifying suicidal propensities.  See Colburn 
II, 946 F.2d at 1025 n.1.  Brandon had attempted suicide 
on prior occasions and told prison officials so.  The 
prison identified Brandon as a “suicide behavior risk” 
and rated him “Stability Rating D,” diagnosed him with 
multiple, serious mental illnesses known to heighten the 
risk of self-harm, and placed him on the “mental health 
roster.”  The Palakovics allege that all of this information 
was set forth in Brandon’s records, which the corrections 
officers and medical staff must have—or, at the very 
least, should have—reviewed when considering both his 
treatment and whether or not to repeatedly place him in 
solitary confinement.  These facts, taken together, are 
sufficient to support a reasonable inference that prison 
officials and medical personnel knew or should have 
known of Brandon’s particular vulnerability to suicide.   
3. 
 Finally, the District Court concluded that the 
amended complaint failed to adequately plead deliberate 
indifference on the part of any defendant.  In so doing, 
the District Court erroneously applied a subjective test, 
examining what the officials “were actually aware of as 
opposed to what they should have been aware of.”  
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Second Dismissal, 2016 WL 707486 at *7.  Yet our case 
law is clear:  It is not necessary for the custodian to have 
a subjective appreciation of the detainee’s particular 
vulnerability.  Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 320 (quoting 
Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1024–25).  Rather, we have held 
that “reckless or deliberate indifference to that risk” only 
demands “something more culpable on the part of the 
officials than a negligent failure to recognize the high 
risk of suicide.”  Id. (citation omitted).   
 After applying the incorrect standard, the District 
Court then unnecessarily required the Palakovics to 
demonstrate one of three limited factual circumstances—
specifically, where: (1) a defendant took affirmative 
action directly leading to the suicide; (2) a defendant 
actually knew of the suicidal tendencies of a particular 
prisoner and ignored the responsibility to take reasonable 
precautions; or (3) a defendant failed to take “necessary 
and available precautions to protect the prisoner from 
self-inflicted wounds.”  Second Dismissal, 2016 WL 
707486 at *7 (citing Freedman v. City of Allentown, 853 
F.2d 1111, 1115–16 (3d Cir. 1988)).  The District Court 
observed, “Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing 
any of these scenarios.”  Id.   
While these factual scenarios provide helpful 
guidance in determining whether a case meets the 
vulnerability to suicide standard, each case will present 
unique circumstances and should be considered on its 
own facts.  A failure to track the precise contours of our 
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prior caselaw should not, by itself, compel a conclusion 
that a plaintiff has failed to state a vulnerability to suicide 
claim.  Here, in our assessment, the Palakovics 
adequately alleged that the defendants knew of both 
Brandon’s particular vulnerability to suicide and his 
mental health care needs, but—in disregard of that 
knowledge—repeatedly placed him (or permitted his 
placement) in solitary confinement, where they knew that 
the risk of suicide and mental harm was even greater.  
This claim is amply supported by specific factual 
allegations.   
First, as addressed in the preceding section, 
Brandon’s vulnerability was known (or should have been 
known) by prison officials.  Second, according to the 
Palakovics, it was common knowledge that the prison 
was being investigated by the DOJ for “provid[ing] 
inadequate mental health care to prisoners who have 
mental illness, fail[ing] to adequately protect such 
prisoners from harm, and subject[ing] them to 
excessively prolonged periods of isolation, in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”  J.A. 
77.  And, it can hardly be disputed that it is widely 
known and understood that solitary confinement is 
“characterized by extreme deprivation of social 
interaction and environmental stimulation.”  J.A. 68.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, prison officials 
were aware of a history of self-harm and suicide in SCI 
Cresson’s solitary confinement unit in the recent past:  In 
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2011 alone, “14 of the 17 documented suicide attempts at 
SCI Cresson occurred in the solitary confinement units,” 
J.A. 78, and there were “dozens of incidents involving 
prisoners on the mental health roster engaging in self-
harm in the isolation units, while just two such incidents 
occurred in the general population.”  J.A. 78–79.   
These non-conclusory allegations support an 
inference that, despite knowing of Brandon’s 
vulnerability and the increased risk of suicide that 
solitary confinement brings, the defendants disregarded 
that risk and permitted Brandon to be repeatedly isolated 
in solitary confinement anyway.  That is sufficient to 
satisfy the plausibility standard and proceed to discovery 
on the vulnerability to suicide claims as to defendants 
Harrington, Rathore, Eidsvoog, Boyles, and Luther. 
B. 
The Palakovics also asserted a vulnerability to 
suicide claim against MHM, the corporation providing 
medical services at SCI Cresson.  To state a claim against 
a private corporation providing medical services under 
contract with a state prison system, a plaintiff must allege 
a policy or custom that resulted in the alleged 
constitutional violations at issue.  Natale v. Camden Cty. 
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583–84 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Therefore, the question is whether the Palakovics 
sufficiently alleged that MHM had a policy or custom 
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that resulted in a violation of Brandon’s Eighth 
Amendment rights.  
According to the amended complaint, MHM “was 
responsible for under-staffing psychiatric staff, not 
providing necessary forms of mental health treatment 
such as suicide risk assessments and counseling, failing 
to ensure adequate frequency of mental health 
appointments and that such be conducted in a clinically 
appropriate setting, and failing to provide proper medical 
oversight of medication regimes.”  J.A. 76.  Further, 
MHM “was aware that SCI Cresson was warehousing 
people who were seriously mentally ill and those who 
were vulnerable to suicide in solitary confinement, that 
this practice was psychologically harmful and medically 
contraindicated, and they did nothing to intervene on 
behalf of their incarcerated patients.”  Id.  The Palakovics 
buttressed these allegations with findings from the DOJ’s 
investigation and subsequent Report.  The DOJ Report, 
as restated and alleged in the amended complaint, 
specifically found that the mental health care provided by 
SCI Cresson during the time of Brandon’s incarceration 
suffered serious problems including “a dearth of mental 
health treatment,” “insufficient[] staff[ing],” and “poor 
screening and diagnostic procedures.”  J.A. 79–80 
(quoting DOJ Report).   
The Palakovics alleged that MHM’s policies of 
understaffing and failing to provide proper treatment 
resulted in Brandon’s isolation, untreated mental illness, 
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and eventual suicide.  At the motion to dismiss stage, 
these allegations are sufficient to proceed to discovery.  
Absent discovery, the Palakovics could not possibly have 
any greater insight into MHM’s exact policies or their 
impact on Brandon.   
C. 
 Next, the Palakovics raised a vulnerability to 
suicide claim against supervisory defendants Wetzel, 
Cameron, Luther, and Boyles based upon policies and 
practices at SCI Cresson, and a related claim for a failure 
to train SCI Cresson staff “on how to manage prisoners 
with serious mental illness and those that were vulnerable 
to suicide in a manner that would not cause mental health 
injuries.”  J.A. 88.  
 As previously discussed, a plaintiff may state an 
Eighth Amendment claim against a supervisor based on 
policies or practices where the plaintiff alleges that the 
supervisors “knew or were aware of and disregarded an 
excessive risk to the [plaintiff’s] health or safety[.]”  
Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 135.  In somewhat cursory 
fashion, the District Court held that the Palakovics failed 
to allege facts sufficient to establish supervisory 
liability.25  Second Dismissal, 2016 WL 707486 at *8.  
                                                 
25 Although the District Court applied the Sample test, we 
analyze the supervisory liability claims under the Farmer 
test.  See supra n.17.  In any event, both tests are satisfied 
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We conclude, in disagreement with the District Court, 
that the risk here was alleged with sufficient specificity 
and factual support to be so obvious that the Palakovics 
did plead a plausible claim for supervisory liability. 
The Palakovics claimed that the supervisory 
defendants established a policy whereby mentally ill and 
suicidal prisoners like Brandon were repeatedly placed in 
solitary confinement rather than provided with adequate 
mental health treatment.  In the Palakovics’ view, the risk 
of suicide created by repeatedly placing mentally ill 
prisoners in a small cement cell with minimal outside 
visibility, few possessions, and limited human interaction 
is obvious.  And, even if it were not obvious, the prior 
experience of the supervisors—who were aware of other 
instances of suicide and self-harm by prisoners in solitary 
confinement—made them aware of the unreasonable risk.  
Among other things, the Palakovics cite a specific 
incident in May of 2011, less than a year before 
Brandon’s suicide, in which another mentally ill prisoner 
committed suicide while in solitary confinement.  They 
allege that the supervisory defendants would have been 
aware of that and similar recent incidents of self-harm.  
They further allege that the DOJ’s investigation, initiated 
                                                                                                             
by a showing that the risk was “so great and so obvious” 
because “the risk and the failure of supervisory officials 
to respond will alone support” supervisory liability.  
Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 134–35. 
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eight months before Brandon’s suicide, would have 
contributed to their awareness of the potential dangers of 
holding mentally ill and suicidal prisoners in solitary 
confinement. 
 Similar to the policy claim, a failure to train claim 
requires a plaintiff to “identify a failure to provide 
specific training that has a causal nexus with his or her 
injury and must demonstrate that the failure to provide 
that specific training can reasonably be said to reflect a 
deliberate indifference to whether constitutional 
deprivations of the kind alleged occur.”  Colburn II, 946 
F.2d at 1030.  Specifically, in a prison suicide case, this 
means that the plaintiff must (1) “identify specific 
training not provided that could reasonably be expected 
to prevent the suicide that occurred” and (2) 
“demonstrate that the risk reduction associated with the 
proposed training is so great and so obvious that the 
failure of those responsible for the content of the training 
program to provide it can reasonably be attributed to a 
deliberate indifference to whether the detainees succeed 
in taking their lives.”  Id.   
According to the Palakovics, despite the risk and 
the obviousness of the need to correct it, the supervisors 
failed to train officials on how to recognize and properly 
manage seriously mentally ill and suicidal prisoners, 
failed to provide suicide prevention training, failed to 
provide training on the adverse impact of solitary 
confinement on those with mental illness, and failed to 
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train non-medical staff on the importance of consulting 
with mental health care providers concerning discipline 
and management of mentally ill prisoners.  The 
supervisors were alleged to have provided essentially no 
training on suicide, mental health, or the impact of 
solitary confinement, and simply acquiesced in the 
repeated placement of mentally ill prisoners like Brandon 
in solitary confinement. 
According to the Palakovics, the supervisors were 
responsible for the policies concerning the treatment of 
mentally ill prisoners that gave rise to an unreasonable 
risk of Brandon’s suicide, as well as the failure to provide 
specific types of training that could reasonably have 
prevented it.  We must take the factual allegations of the 
amended complaint as true, and those facts are sufficient 
to support claims against the supervisory defendants.   
VII. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the 
Palakovics properly pleaded claims under the Eighth 
Amendment in both their original and amended 
complaints.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District 
Court’s dismissal orders entered on June 26, 2015, and 
February 22, 2016, and will remand this matter to the 
District Court for further proceedings.  On remand, the 
District Court should permit the Palakovics to file a 
second amended complaint setting forth their Eighth 
Amendment claims concerning conditions of 
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confinement, inadequate mental healthcare, vulnerability 
to suicide, and failure to train.26   
                                                 
26 We reiterate that any second amended complaint may 
not plead claims against the three voluntarily dismissed 
defendants (Kushner, Reed, and Dous) or the defendants 
named in the original complaint who were not named in 
the amended complaint (Michelle Houser, Morris 
Houser, Francis Pirozzola, Shawn Kephart, and John 
Does #1-6), as the Palakovics have abandoned their 
claims against each of those individuals.  See supra, 
notes 11, 13.  In addition, the Eighth Amendment claims 
should proceed against the remaining defendants in their 
individual capacities only.  See supra, note 20.  
